Background: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) remains one of the most common causes of health careassociated infection (HAI).
S taphylococcus aureus is one of the most common human pathogens. Between 2011 and 2014, S aureus was the second most common cause of devicerelated infections (central line-associated bloodstream infection [CLABSI], catheter-associated urinary tract infection [CAUTI]), and ventilator-associated pneumonia) and surgical-site infections reported by U.S. hospitals to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (1) . Methicillin-resistant S aureus (MRSA) accounted for 42% to 57% of the S aureus isolates associated with these infections.
Staphylococcus aureus infections are associated with substantial morbidity and mortality. Some studies have reported that morbidity and mortality are greater among persons with infections caused by MRSA than in those with infections caused by methicillin-susceptible strains (2, 3) . Most symptomatic S aureus infections, including those caused by MRSA, are preceded by asymptomatic mucocutaneous colonization with MRSA (4, 5) . Thus, optimal prevention of MRSA infections in health care settings is focused on interrupting patientto-patient transmission and reducing the risk for invasive infection among persons who are colonized with the pathogen.
Bloodstream infections (BSIs) with MRSA are not a single disease process or clinical entity, but are rather a systemic manifestation of infections that originate either at other body sites (for example, pneumonia) or in association with foreign materials (for example, indwelling vascular catheters) (6) . Thus, MRSA BSI may be a marker for overall MRSA burden, effectiveness of infection prevention practices, and success in health care-associ-
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Web-Only CME/MOC activity ated infection (HAI) risk mitigation in health care facilities. In 2016, 4624 acute care, long-term acute care, and critical access hospitals reported 9325 hospital-onset MRSA BSIs to the CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) (7) . During this period, 7% of acute care hospitals and 10% of long-term acute care hospitals (LTACHs) had hospital-onset MRSA BSI standardized infection ratios (SIRs) that were significantly higher than the national SIR, suggesting that substantial opportunities remain for prevention of MRSA infection in many U.S. hospitals despite the availability of evidence-based clinical practice recommendations for the prevention of MRSA infection and transmission (8) . To support acute care hospitals, LTACHs, and critical access hospitals with a disproportionate burden of HAIs, the CDC funded a national project called STRIVE (States Targeting Reduction in Infections via Engagement) to bring these hospitals together with state-level organizations to improve infection prevention practices. This article describes the MRSA-related outcomes observed among participating facilities.
METHODS
The CDC STRIVE initiative was designed to bring together individual hospitals, state hospital associations, state health departments, and Quality Innovation Network-Quality Improvement Organizations (QIN-QIOs) to enhance and facilitate the implementation of infection prevention strategies in hospitals with a disproportionately high burden of HAIs as defined by the CDC's Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) strategy (9) . The project focused on prevention of CLABSI, CAUTI, Clostridioides difficile infection, and hospital-onset MRSA BSI. We describe the MRSA-related outcomes observed among participating facilities in cohorts 2 to 4 of the project; cohort 1 was used as a pilot to test project recruitment and engagement strategies.
Data Sources, Measurements, and Outcomes
The primary outcome of interest was the incidence of hospital-onset MRSA BSI laboratory-identified events as defined by the NHSN (that is, isolation of MRSA from a blood specimen obtained >3 days after hospital admission without a prior MRSA-positive blood culture from the same patient and same hospital location within 14 days) (10) . The monthly incidence of hospitalonset MRSA BSI was calculated as the total number of hospital-onset MRSA BSI events reported by a hospital during a calendar month divided by the total number of patient-days during the same month. Analysis was conducted after dividing participant data into 2 periods: 12 months preintervention and 12 months postintervention. The intervention period included the 12-month period beginning on the first day of the next full month after the cohort's kick-off meeting.
All participating facilities submitted MRSA BSI data to NHSN as part of the requirements of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Inpatient Prospective Payment System Inpatient Quality Reporting Program. Participating hospitals granted the STRIVE project team access to deidentified MRSA BSI data submitted to NHSN. Hospital characteristics, including number of beds, teaching status, urban or rural location, ownership, and hospital type, were obtained from the 2015 American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals (11) . Components of participating hospitals' infection prevention and control programs were determined at baseline and at the end of the intervention period by using the CDC Infection Control Assessment and Response (ICAR) and Practice Change Assessment (PCA) tools (12) .
Study Design and Cohort Recruitment
The STRIVE initiative was a prospective, nonrandomized, interventional, 12-month, multiple cohort quality improvement project conducted in multiple U.S. states among acute care hospitals, LTACHs, and critical access hospitals with a disproportionate burden of HAIs. "Critical access hospital" is a designation made by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and includes hospitals that are small (≤25 inpatient beds), have short lengths of stay (average ≤96 hours), and are located more than 35 miles from another hospital or serve a community that is otherwise physically remote from another hospital (for example, because of terrain or road conditions).
Hospitals were recruited from 30 states that were identified as having a disproportionate burden of HAIs on the basis of HAI data submitted to the CDC during January through June 2015. Individual hospitals were targeted for recruitment if their data indicated a high burden of C difficile infection and one or more of the following HAIs: CLABSI, CAUTI, or MRSA BSI. Four cohorts of hospitals were recruited between 2016 and 2017. A "high burden" of C difficile infection was defined as having a cumulative attributable difference above the first tertile (hospital performance within the worst one third of hospitals) in the TAP strategy (9) . In addition to the targeted hospitals, other hospitals could also volunteer to join.
The first cohort of hospitals was designated a pilot cohort to test and refine recruitment and engagement strategies. The later 3 cohorts were included in the analysis described in this article. The STRIVE project, including its rationale, structure, and hospital recruitment strategies, is described elsewhere (13) .
The University of Michigan Medical School Institutional Review Board reviewed the study and determined that it did not meet the regulatory definition of research involving human subjects.
Intervention
The STRIVE intervention consisted of several components, which are described in greater detail elsewhere (13) . Participants were asked to complete a baseline assessment of infection prevention practices by using either the ICAR or PCA tool to identify gaps and opportunities, participate in Web-based educational programming that addressed "foundational" and infection-specific (for example, MRSA or CLABSI) prevention strategies, and implement evidence-based prevention strategies. Monthly webinars, known as Learn-ing Action Forums, were provided by the STRIVE team to reinforce educational content and implementation strategies and give participants access to coaching by subject-matter experts. In addition, state partners were expected to conduct at least one in-person meeting for participants in their state and to conduct site visits at a minimum of 50% of STRIVE participants within the state. The site visits were intended to serve as opportunities to provide technical assistance, education, and coaching. At the end of the project period, hospitals were asked to submit a second ICAR or PCA assessment so that changes that occurred during participation could be identified. Additional details of hospital engagement and implementation techniques; educational programming and resources; and the role of state health departments, hospital associations, and QIN-QIOs are published elsewhere (13) .
Hospitals were provided with recommendations for a structured approach to the implementation of evidence-based MRSA prevention strategies (14) . The recommended interventions were divided into 2 categories: tier 1 and tier 2. Tier 1 interventions were recommended for all participating facilities and included some elements that were not specific to MRSA prevention, referred to as "foundational elements," and some elements that were MRSA-specific interventions. Foundational elements included monitoring and encouraging compliance with recommended hand-hygiene practices and assessment of the thoroughness of cleaning and disinfection of the hospital environment and medical equipment. Interventions specific to MRSA included conducting an MRSA risk assessment, reviewing MRSA BSI cases to guide source-specific (for example, vascular catheterassociated BSI, pneumonia, surgical-site infection, skin and soft-tissue infection) interventions, communicating MRSA colonization and/or infection status within and among health care facilities, and using contact precautions for patients colonized or infected with MRSA. Tier 2 interventions were recommended if a hospital's MRSA rates remained elevated despite implementation of tier 1 interventions. Tier 2 interventions were generally more costly or labor-intensive than tier 1 interventions and included daily patient bathing with chlorhexidine gluconate, MRSA decolonization, active surveillance testing for MRSA colonization, and universal gowning and gloving for patients in the intensive care unit. Hospitals could implement one or more tier 2 elements. Additional information on the components and rationale for each of the elements in the tiered approach to MRSA prevention are described elsewhere (14) . A guide to patient safety selfassessment tool was available to help participants prioritize tier 2 strategies for implementation (15) .
Interventions began after the initial cohort kick-off meeting. With the exception of the Learning Action Forums, which were conducted simultaneously for all participating hospitals within a cohort, participating hospitals and/or state partners determined the specific timing and priority of each intervention (Appendix Figure 1 , available at Annals.org).
Statistical Analysis
All analyses included aggregated data from cohorts 2 through 4. Characteristics of participating hospitals, including components of their infection prevention and control programs, were reported using descriptive statistics. The hospital-onset MRSA BSI incidence density rate was calculated as the number of unique MRSA BSI events per 1000 patient-days. Ninety-five percent CIs were calculated by using a bootstrap approach in which we resampled the data at each time point 10 000 times, recalculating the MRSA BSI incidence rate in each sample. A 95% normal-based CI was then calculated on the basis of the bootstrap estimates. A Sankey bar graph was generated by using SAS software (SAS Institute) to display the aggregated pre-and postintervention results by hospital, using the macro %sankeybarchart (16) . All analyses were conducted in Stata, version 13 (StataCorp); SAS software, version 9.4; and R Project (R Foundation for Statistical Computing).
Role of the Funding Source
This study was funded by the CDC via a contract that specified program objectives and deliverables and general project oversight, and also enabled provision of NHSN data for outcome analysis. The CDC had no role in the design of the study, writing of the article, or analysis of the data.
RESULTS
The flow diagram of hospital recruitment, enrollment, and data submission is provided in Appendix Figure 2 (available at Annals.org). A total of 404 hospitals participated in cohorts 2 through 4 of the STRIVE project. Seventeen hospitals (4%) withdrew from the project. Of the remaining 387 hospitals, 353 (91%) submitted MRSA BSI data and were included in the analysis. Among these 353 facilities, 246 (70%) were acute care hospitals, 72 (20%) were critical access hospitals, and 35 (10%) were LTACHs. Characteristics of these hospitals are presented in Table 1 . Among these hospitals, 172 (49%), including 122 acute care, 35 critical access, and 15 LTACHs, reported that MRSA BSI prevention would be an area of focus during their participation in the project. The 12-month postintervention periods for the 3 cohorts were November 2016 to October 2017, April 2017 to March 2018, and June 2017 to May 2018.
An assessment of baseline infection prevention and control practices was completed by 350 hospitals (99%) by using either the ICAR or PCA tool. The percentage of hospitals that reported use of certain practices relevant to the prevention and control of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs), such as MRSA, is shown in Appendix Table  1 , available at Annals.org. Although implementation of several foundational and MDRO-focused strategies was common (for example, 92% of hospitals had handhygiene adherence auditing programs and 94% had a program to monitor the incidence of MDROs, such as MRSA), several recommended strategies had not yet been implemented by a substantial proportion of partici-Quantitative Results of National MRSA BSI Intervention pating hospitals (for example, only 57% had a process to audit compliance with use of personal protective equipment, only 67% had environmental cleaning adherence monitoring programs, and only 72% had a process to determine infection status and isolation needs for patients being transferred to the hospital from another health care facility).
Participating hospitals reported a total of 2144 hospital-onset MRSA BSI events during the study period, including 1099 during the preintervention periods and 1045 during the postintervention periods ( Table  2 ). The overall rate of hospital-onset MRSA BSI during the study period was 0.073 per 1000 patient-days (0.075 preintervention and 0.071 postintervention). Monthly rates of hospital-onset MRSA BSI during the pre-and postintervention periods among participating hospitals are shown in Appendix Figure 3 (available at Annals.org). Monthly rates of hospital-onset MRSA BSI among the participating hospitals that indicated that MRSA BSI prevention was a specific area of focus during the project period are shown in Appendix Figure 4 and Appendix Table 2 (available at Annals.org). Rates during the pre-and postintervention periods and the change between the 2 periods at the hospital level are shown in the Figure and in Appendix Tables 3 and 4 (available at Annals.org). Nearly 36% of reporting hospitals had MRSA BSI rates of zero during both periods, and a reduction of 50% or more between the pre-and postintervention periods was observed in 17% of reporting hospitals. Among the hospitals that observed such a reduction, 87% were acute care; 56% were nonteaching; 84% urban; and 67% were nongovernment, nonprofit hospitals.
DISCUSSION
The STRIVE initiative was a prospective, 12-month, interventional, nonrandomized, clustered intervention conducted in multiple states that targeted hospitals with a disproportionate burden of HAIs. Participating hospitals were provided with recommendations for tiered implementation of evidence-based foundational and MRSAspecific infection control interventions; tools to assess deficits in baseline infection prevention program activities; educational materials; and opportunities to participate in live, Web-based educational seminars. Despite this intensive effort and resource development, no sig-nificant change in the rate of hospital-onset MRSA BSI was observed between the baseline and postintervention periods.
Our study has several strengths. First, it was a large study. Cohorts 2 through 4, those included in the analysis, were made up of 387 hospitals from 23 states and the District of Columbia. Unlike many previous infection prevention studies and large-scale initiatives that have been conducted in acute care hospitals, STRIVE participants also included LTACHs and critical access hospitals. Thus, the study population was representative of the wider spectrum of U.S. hospitals. In addition, we specifically recruited hospitals with a disproportionate burden of HAIs in an effort to include hospitals with the greatest opportunities for improvement. The study design was pragmatic, providing access to resources and educational materials while empowering individual hospitals and their existing partners (state hospital as- Quantitative Results of National MRSA BSI Intervention sociations and health departments and QIN-QIOs) to implement infection prevention interventions.
Our study also has limitations. First, baseline rates of hospital-onset MRSA BSI were relatively low among participating hospitals (0.075 per 1000 patient-days). Thus, the ability to achieve and to detect improvement may have been limited. In fact, although the postintervention rates of hospital-onset MRSA BSI among participating acute care and critical access hospitals were higher than the average rate reported to NHSN in 2017 by all U.S. acute care and critical access hospitals (0.052 and 0.014 per 1000 patient-days, respectively) (17), 57%, 97%, and 66% of participating acute care, critical access, and LTACHs, respectively, had postintervention MRSA BSI rates that were below the 2017 national average for their facility type.
Second, only 172 (49%) of the 353 facilities that submitted MRSA data indicated that MRSA prevention would be an area of focus during their participation in the project. This may suggest that motivation to implement additional MRSA-specific interventions was low in the 181 facilities that did not identify MRSA prevention as an area of focus, perhaps contributing to the lack of change in outcomes over time. Furthermore, we were unable to quantify the degree of each hospital's participation; the selection, timing, and completeness of implementation of individual prevention strategies; and the degree of compliance with those interventions.
Third, the intervention period was relatively short, and it is possible that full implementation of recommended interventions could not be completed during the study period.
Fourth, many of the recommended interventions were based on the findings of studies conducted in acute care hospitals-often in intensive care units-and their efficacy in other settings, such as non-critical care wards and LTACHs, has not been well studied. Notably, in a recent cluster randomized trial conducted in non- 
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In this Sankey bar chart, the connecting segments show how hospitals changed from the pre-to the postintervention periods. The slopes of the connecting segments should be interpreted cautiously because some segments connecting to the same rate category are increasing or decreasing visually but indicate no change in rates in these hospitals. Only segments that connect to a different category indicate changes in rates from the preto the postintervention period. BSI = bloodstream infection; MRSA = methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
Quantitative Results of National MRSA BSI Intervention critical care units, universal bathing with chlorhexidine for all patients and targeted nasal mupirocin for MRSA-colonized patients did not result in a significant reduction in the primary outcome of MRSA or vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus clinical cultures (18) . In post hoc analysis, however, a significant reduction in MRSA clinical cultures was observed among patients with medical devices who had been assigned to the chlorhexidine bathing and mupirocin decolonization group, suggesting that this intervention may provide benefit to some patient groups. Finally, the epidemiology of MRSA is complex and influenced by many factors, including patient-level characteristics and risk factors that were not included in the data shared by participating hospitals and which therefore could not be included in the analysis. Similarly, transmission of MRSA outside of the participating hospitals, such as in the community or in nonparticipating health care facilities, could not be addressed in this project.
Although this was technically a null study, the results do not necessarily indicate that the prevention strategies themselves, or that the tiered approach to prevention, are ineffective for prevention of MRSA infections in health care facilities. In addition to the limitations described, several other factors may have contributed to the participating hospitals' failure to realize a decrease in hospital-onset MRSA BSI. Of note, the STRIVE project was not focused solely on MRSA prevention. The project also targeted prevention of CLABSI, CAUTI, and C difficile infection. Thus, hospitals may have been unable to provide adequate time, effort, and resources for successful implementation of all recommended MRSA prevention strategies in the relatively short study period. The baseline survey of infection prevention practices at participating facilities indicated that the infection prevention programs at a majority of the hospitals included many of the recommended foundational and MRSA-specific interventions before the intervention period. Also, the hospitals recruited to participate in the project were selected on the basis of evidence of a disproportionately high burden of HAIs. These hospitals may differ from hospitals with a lower burden of HAIs in several important ways, such as resource availability and allocation for infection prevention, patient population, engagement of and buy-in from leaders and frontline staff, culture of safety, and competing priorities (19 -22) . Finally, although not actively recruited, hospitals that were not within the lowest tertile of HAI outcomes were also allowed to enroll in the project. Compared with the targeted hospitals with a disproportionate burden of HAIs, such hospitals may have had lower MRSA BSI rates and more effective infection prevention programs in place at baseline, thus reducing our ability to detect a difference between the pre-and postintervention MRSA BSI rates observed among all participating hospitals combined.
Although no significant reductions in hospitalonset MRSA BSI were observed among the participating facilities, several important lessons may be learned from this study of a tiered approach for prevention of MRSA transmission and infection in hospitals. First, our findings and the inability to determine the reasons why we failed to observe an improvement in MRSA BSI rates highlight the importance of measuring the degree to which interventions are implemented and identifying and addressing barriers to implementation. Although these measurements and assessments are challenging, particularly in large, pragmatic initiatives like STRIVE, this type of insight is critical to understanding the reasons for success and failure and is relevant to research studies and quality improvement initiatives. Perhaps even more important, this study suggests that when it comes to preventing MRSA infections, what has worked in the setting of randomized controlled trials and in individual hospitals may not easily translate to similar success in routine clinical practice in other settings. The specific needs, challenges, and barriers that exist within each facility for prevention of MRSA infections should be identified and addressed in order to achieve optimal success. 
